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Abstract 
What role do firms play in the making of EU trade policy? This article surveys the 
policy domain and lays out the instruments firms can employ to influence decisions 
on trade. It underlines that European trade policy is characterized by a high degree of 
institutional complexity, which firms have to manage in order to be successful. In 
particular, the European Commission works intensively to solicit business input in 
order to gain bargaining leverage vis-à-vis third countries and the EU member states. 
This reverse lobbying creates a two-channel logic of trade policy lobbying in the EU. 
Corporate actors have a very good chance of working closely with the European 
Commission if they can propose pan-European trade policy solutions. This can be 
either trade liberalization or EU-wide regulatory restrictions on trade. Demands for 
traditional protectionist measures, especially those that reveal national interest 
divergences, are difficult to defend at the supranational level. Protectionist lobbying 
therefore goes through the national route, with corporate actors working to block 
liberalization by affecting the consensus in the Council of Ministers. The chapter 
illustrates this two-channel logic by studying business– government interactions in 
agricultural trade, textiles and clothing, financial services, and telecommunication 
services.  
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Zusammenfassung 
Welchen Einfluss haben Unternehmen auf die europäische Handelspolitik? Durch 
einen Überblick des Politikfelds analysiert der Artikel Instrumente, mit denen 
Unternehmen in der EU Lobbyismus betreiben können. Vielen Firmen werden 
allerdings nicht von sich aus aktiv. Im Gegenteil, die Europäische Kommission 
bemüht sich aktiv um die Zusammenarbeit der Unternehmen, da sie dadurch ihre 
Verhandlungsposition vis-à-vis Mitgliedsstaaten und Drittstaaten stärken kann. 
Dieses umgekehrte Lobbying hat Folgen für die Inhalte der 
Unternehmensforderungen im Bereich Handelspolitik. Wirtschaftliche Akteure können 
ein gutes Arbeitsverhältnis mit der Europäischen Kommission aufbauen, wenn sie 
gesamteuropäische Konzepte verfolgen, sei es Handelsliberalisierung oder EU-weite 
Regulierung. Nationaler Protektionismus kann europäische Entscheidungsfindung 
blockieren, so dass merkantilistische Anfragen an die nationalen Regierungen 
gerichtet werden müssen, die diese dann durch den Rat der Minister voranbringen 
können. Der Artikel illustriert diese zweigleisige Lobbyingstrategien in der 
Landwirtschaft, dem Textilhandel, dem Finanzdienstleistungssektor und der 
Telekommunikation.  
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Introduction 
  
Trade policy is a classic field for the study of private influence on policy-making. 
Firms and industries can gain clear advantages by protecting their markets from 
foreign competition or by gaining access to other countries. A large portion of the 
literature on international political economy therefore explains policy choices with 
reference to the demands of constituent interests (see Frieden and Martin 2002). For 
anybody interested in business lobbying, trade policy would seem to be the most 
appropriate place to start. 
  
And yet, comparing trade policy lobbying in the US and the EU leaves many 
observers surprised. Aggressive business lobbying on trade issues is much less 
common in Brussels than it is in Washington, D.C. (e.g. Coen 1999; cf. Woll 2006). 
Shaffer (2003: 6) underlines that US firms and trade associations are very proactive 
in business– government relations on trade policy. This "bottom-up" approach 
contrasts with the "top down" EU approach where public authority, in particular the 
European Commission, plays the predominant entrepreneurial role. 
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While the US Trade Representative responded to onslaughts of private sector 
lobbying reinforced by congressional phone calls and committee grillings, the 
Commission had to contact firms to contact it (Shaffer 2003: 70). 
  
Indeed, we will see that the European Commission has made a concerted effort to 
integrate firms and other private actors into the trade policy-making process in order 
to gain bargaining leverage not simply vis-à-vis third countries, but also over its own 
member states (Van den Hoven 2002). By helping to elaborate policy solutions, 
interest group participation increases the legitimacy of the Commission on external 
trade issues. 
  
This reverse lobbying is not without consequences. While firms do increasingly seize 
the opportunities available to them at the supranational level, EU trade policy 
lobbying is marked by a particular logic. Firms face a trade-off between pressing for 
their immediate advantages and responding to the interests of the European 
Commission, which promises them access to the policy-making process (Broscheid 
and Coen 2003). Since the Commission is not immediately accountable to 
constituency interests, it can select interest groups and firms that it prefers to work 
with and ignore others (Grande 1996). In selecting private partners, the Commission 
follows two objectives: first, it requires technical expertise to advance on its policy 
proposals (Bouwen 2002); second, and on trade issues in particular, it is interested in 
finding pan-European solutions to prevent disputes between the member states that 
would risk stalling trade negotiations (Shaffer 2003: 78-79). When protectionist 
measures depend on national boundaries, industry privileges are likely to conflict with 
the Commission's goals. Firms therefore have to decide between lobbying for their 
immediate advantage at the risk of being ignored and framing their demands in terms 
of a pan-European interest even if they are not certain of obtaining an advantage. 
  
This logic creates two distinct channels for trade policy lobbying in the EU. A firm or 
industry interested in classic protectionism is most successful when it uses a national 
lobbying strategy directed at the member states and ultimately the Council of 
Ministers. Supranational lobbying, in turn, requires making demands with pan-
European dimensions. Lobbyists thus have to find ways of proposing pan-European 
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protectionism, most commonly in the form of pan-European trade regulation (Young 
2004). Alternatively, they can lobby for trade liberalization in order to establish or 
maintain contacts with the European Commission and then hope to integrate more 
precise demands in the details of trade regulation or the implementation of 
agreements. 
  
By studying the Europeanization of trade policy and the instruments firms employ to 
affect EU trade policy, a first part of this paper underlines the complexity individual 
firms have to manage in order to influence the Community stance on international 
trade negotiations. As an illustration of the EU trade policy lobbying logic, a second 
part then turns to concrete policy examples and compares the protectionist lobbying 
on agriculture and textiles and clothing with the lobbying on service trade 
liberalization in financial services and telecommunications. The conclusion discusses 
the extent to which the findings on business lobbying have implications for other 
actors seeking to affect trade policy, most notably NGOs or public interest groups. 
  
  
1    Trade policy lobbying in the multi-level system 
  
Trade policy is one of the most integrated policy areas in the EU, and yet the struggle 
over the competence distribution between the supranational institutions and the 
member states is crucial for understanding lobbying in this domain. Before turning to 
the key instruments for corporate lobbying on EU trade, it is therefore necessary to 
understand the Europeanization of trade policy and the history of competence 
delegation from the member states to the EU Institutions.  
  
  
1.1   The integration of trade policy-making 
  
The common commercial policy is as old as the European Economic Community 
itself. With the Treaty of Rome in 1957, member states agreed that a customs union 
requires a common external tariff, common trade agreements with third countries and 
uniform application across member states. On these issues, they therefore granted 
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the European institutions the right to speak on their behalf in external trade 
negotiations. Initially, this authority applied to tariff rates, anti-dumping and subsidies, 
which were indeed the main stakes in early multilateral trade negotiations under the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). During the Tokyo Round of GATT 
(1973-9) and especially during the Uruguay Round (1986-94), non-tariff barriers to 
trade started to gain importance, including health, environmental and social aspects 
of trade policy, and the domestic regulatory issues applying to the trade in services. 
European trade authority did not apply to many of these issues, which pushed the 
Community to redefine trade competences and the degree of delegation from the 
member states to the EU. In particular, it stirred up a debate over which issues 
should fall under "exclusive" or "mixed" competence (Meunier and Nicolaïdis 1999; 
Meunier 2000a). 
  
Mixed competence means that trade authority is delegated on an ad hoc basis to the 
Community. The setting of objectives and the ratification of the negotiation results are 
subject to a unanimous vote by the Council, whereas both require only a qualified 
majority under exclusive competence. Over time, many areas of mixed competence 
have been dealt with pragmatically at first, by letting the Commission negotiate 
without fully resolving the competence dispute. For the results to be adopted, 
however, the legal competence question has become pressing. When the European 
Court of Justice decided against an automatic expansion of trade competences in 
1994, the Commission and the member states first agreed on a code of conduct and 
later adopted a special competence transfer procedure in 1996 (Meunier 2000b: 338-
40). It was not until 2003 that the Treaty of Nice finally amended Article 133 and 
provided for the exclusive competence over services and intellectual property rights, 
with the exception of cultural and audio-visual services. The struggle underlines how 
heavily disputed the transfer of authority is. Delegation is a delicate matter, even in 
this highly integrated policy domain, and control mechanisms employed by member 
states are tight (De Bièvre and Dür 2005). 
  
The various control mechanisms become evident when one considers the different 
stages in the trade policy-making cycle. Woolcock (2000) distinguishes between (1) 
the setting of objectives, (2) the conduct of negotiations and (3) the adoption of 
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results. The negotiation objectives are decided by the General Affairs Council of 
foreign ministers on the basis of a Commission proposal. Long before the formal 
adoption of a mandate, the Commission submits the proposal to the member states 
or, more precisely, to senior national trade officials representing their governments on 
the Article 133 Committee (see Johnson 1998). Discussions during this phase are 
crucial, since the Commission can use the Article 133 Committee "as a sounding 
board to ensure that it is on the right track" (Shaffer 2003: 79). Trying to achieve a 
consensus on the mandate, the Article 133 Committee examines and amends the 
proposal before handing it to the Committee of Permanent Representatives 
(COREPER) and eventually the Council. Neither the European Parliament nor the 
general public participate in these early negotiations, which take place behind closed 
doors in order to shield the negotiation objectives from the trading partners. 
Woolcock (2000: 380) underlines how sharply the role of the European Parliament 
contrasts with the role of the US Congress. Indeed, constituents lobbying their 
representatives have more direct control over the negotiating mandate in the US, 
where Congress can grant or withhold negotiation authority. 
  
The conduct of negotiations is the responsibility of the Commission, but even in areas 
of exclusive competence, consultation with the member states is crucial. The Article 
133 Committee closely follows negotiations and the EU negotiation team meets daily 
with member state representatives. On sensitive issues such as service trade 
liberalization, trading partners have jokingly remarked that the Commission 
negotiates more with the member states than with the rest of the world (Woll 2004: 
227). The Commission, furthermore, tries to keep the External Economic Relations 
Committee of the European Parliament informed, even though the Parliament has no 
speaking rights during negotiations. Results are adopted by the General Affairs 
Council either by qualified majority voting under exclusive competence or by 
unanimous decision under mixed competence. In practice, however, consensus 
decisions are the norm (Woolcock 2000: 384). 
  
The importance of consensus between the member states applies equally to dispute 
settlement procedures. The most common way to bring a dispute to the WTO is for 
the Commission to initiate a case after consultation with the Article 133 Committee. 
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Formal procedure requires conflictual issues to be transferred to COREPER and 
subsequently to the Council, should all other instances fail to resolve the dispute. In 
all the time the WTO has employed the dispute settlement procedure, this has only 
happened once. According to Shaffer (2003: 80) 
  
"neither committee members nor the Commission wish to transfer decision-
making authority on trade matters from themselves, who are trade experts, to the 
Council, which consists of foreign affairs ministers."  
  
To summarize, all stages of trade policy-making are characterized by an explicit 
desire to achieve and maintain consensus between the member states. The 
Commission cannot negotiate effectively if the EU member states are not behind the 
Community objectives. The interlocking of member state control and Commission 
authority are thus the two important dimensions of trade policy-making that interest 
groups and firms need to take into account if they wish to lobby effectively. 
  
  
1.2    Instruments and venues for corporate lobbying 
  
Consultation with private actors happens at various stages of EU trade policy-
making. Business interests, furthermore, affect the use of instruments of commercial 
defence, with which the Community tries to ensure equal competition for European 
and foreign firms. During trade negotiations and with respect to instruments of 
commercial defence, the solicitation by the Commission plays a key role in shaping 
the access of private actors to the policy-making process. 
  
  
1.2.1  Trade policy consultation with private actors 
  
Even though discussions between the Commission and the Article 133 Committee on 
negotiation objectives are not public, the Commission consults extensively with firms, 
interest groups and NGOs in order to define specific stakes in its proposal. The EU 
consultation procedure is less formal than the system of Trade Advisory Committees 
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in the US, but the Commission DG Trade and DG Industry maintain stable relations 
with groups such as the Union of Industries of the European Community (UNICE) or 
sectoral business associations. In 1998, the Commission tried to formalize its 
consultation and include a broader range of interest groups by instituting a Civil 
Society Dialogue on the upcoming round of negotiations (Van den Hoven 2002; De 
Bièvre and Dür forthcoming). Both business interests and public interest groups now 
participate in the Civil Society Dialogue. However, unlike the US advisory system, the 
Commission is under no legal obligation to consult with the Civil Society Dialogue or 
to take its reports into consideration. 
  
Yet input from interest groups is valuable to the European Commission because it 
can help strengthen its negotiation stances vis-à-vis the member states and its 
trading partners. During the Uruguay Round, American negotiators cooperated 
closely with US industry representatives. By contrast, the European business 
community was largely absent from the negotiations, despite the importance of 
multilateral trading stakes. Only UNICE declared in favour of the Commission 
position, and Jacques Delors complained openly about the lack of business support 
(Grant 1994: 83-5; Van den Hoven 2002: 10). 
  
Integrating business interests into the formulation of trade objectives therefore 
became an important goal for the European Commission in the 1990s. One of the 
most noted initiatives was the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD), founded by 
the US Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown and European Trade Commissioner Sir 
Leon Brittan in 1995. The aim of the TABD was to bring together CEOs of American 
and European companies so that they could "pre-negotiate" issues relevant to 
transatlantic trade (Coen and Grant 2000; Cowles 2001). Similarly, the Commission 
encouraged the creation of other consultative associations, such as the European 
Service Forum, launched in January 1999. Initiatives such as the Civil Society 
Dialogue, the TABD or the European Service Forum illustrate the extent to which the 
Commission solicits participation from private actors and is willing to listen to their 
suggestions. 
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However, individual groups have few means of putting direct pressure on the 
Commission to ensure that their demands will be taken into account. Within each 
member state, they can try to lobby their governments to affect the consensus 
between member states and the Commission during all phases of the policy cycle. 
They can also contact the European Parliament, which holds hearings and produces 
reports on trade issues, but this will do little more than shape the atmosphere in 
which EU objectives are determined and monitored (Woolcock 2000: 380). During the 
adoption phase, national parliaments and the European Parliament may play a 
greater role in the future, especially now that co-decision has been extended by the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, but lobbying on trade policy still concentrates on the 
interchange between the Commission and member governments. 
  
  
1.2.2  Instruments of commercial defence 
  
In addition to ongoing trade negotiations, business lobbying can also target separate 
administrative procedures to ensure protection against 'unfair' foreign competition. 
These instruments of commercial defence include anti-dumping and countervailing 
duties and the Trade Barriers Regulation of 1994. All of these administrative 
instruments require the identification of unfair competition practices, for which firms 
often have better information than governments. Over time, the EU has therefore 
tried to facilitate business input, so as to identify the greatest possible number of 
trade barriers or obstacles to competition. 
  
Anti-dumping measures, by far the most commonly used instrument of commercial 
defence, seek to punish exporters who sell their goods in the EU below the cost of 
their domestic production. The procedure begins with a complaint filed by industry 
representatives, which the Commission then decides to pursue or not. In the event of 
an investigation, the Commission studies in consultation with the national authorities 
whether there is evidence of dumping or injury to a European industry and seeks 
proof that the imposition of duties would be in the 'Community interest'. Hearings are 
held to define the Community interest and to make it difficult for narrow protectionist 
interests to pursue anti-dumping actions (Woolcock 2000: 389-90). In fact, petitioners 
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need to represent 50% of the injured industry, which makes it hard for individual firms 
to file a complaint (De Bièvre 2002: 86). After the imposition of a provisional duty by 
the Commission, the Council can decide by simple majority to reject the duty or to 
impose definite action. 
  
Until the beginning of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which replaced GATT in 
1995, the commercial policy of the EU was relatively defensive. European trade 
officials had simultaneously to respond to demands for protection through anti-
dumping measures and to face the US, which actively sought to dismantle European 
trade barriers. Faced with "aggressive unilateralism" from the US (Bhagwati and 
Patrick 1991), the EU had sought to create a New Commercial Policy Instrument in 
1984, which tried to emulate US business– government cooperation in identifying 
trade barriers. Unlike the US model, the European procedure was marred with 
difficulties. In its ten year history, European firms filed only seven petitions (Shaffer 
2003: 84-94). In December 1994, the instrument was replaced by the Trade Barriers 
Regulation, which supporters were hoping would have more teeth. Innovations 
included the right of individual firms to petition the Commission directly, as may 
member governments. Furthermore, the petitioner no longer needs to provide proof 
of injury in order to file the complaint. The Trade Barrier Regulation requires the EU 
to exhaust all available multilateral dispute settlement procedures before resorting to 
unilateral action, which means that the procedure serves mostly as a means of 
identifying potential WTO dispute settlement cases.  
  
Indeed, soliciting industry help in identifying such cases was one of the main 
motivations behind the Trade Barrier Regulation. Traditional international trade 
disputes were initiated by the Commission in consultation with the Article 133 
Committee. Lacking close cooperation with business interests and trade 
associations, the EU was much less able to exploit the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Body when it was first established in 1995. The US, by contrast, brought several 
high-profile cases against the EU, and filed 8 of the first 15 complaints resulting in 
panels [1]. Commission officials felt that they needed to show more initiative and 
started to work actively to gain industry support and industry's technical expertise on 
existing trade barriers. 
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In February 1996, the Commission launched a new Market Access Strategy, 
tactically announced by Sir Leon Brittan as "D-Day for European Trade Policy" to an 
audience of major exporting companies (Shaffer 2003: 68). Within DG Trade, a 
Market Access Unit was established, the primary role of which was to interact with 
business actors to gather information on existing trade barriers. A central pillar of the 
work was the maintenance of a Market Access Database (see De Bièvre 2002: 96-
100)[2]. By centralizing information on trade barriers and involving firms in the 
collection of information, the EU was hoping to be able to counter the aggressive 
private– public partnerships of US trade policy. As the administration of instruments 
of commercial defence shows, the Commission explicitly urged business participation 
in instruments of commercial defence in order to gain leverage over its trading 
partners.  
  
  
1.3   Trade-offs in multi-level trade lobbying 
  
The study of trade negotiations and of the administration of instruments of 
commercial defence illustrates how important business participation is for the internal 
and external negotiations of the European Commission. The solicitation is based on 
the Commission's hopes of increasing its technical expertise, its legitimacy, its ability 
to maintain consensus among the member states and its leverage in trade 
negotiations. However, since Commission officials do not depend on re-election by 
constituency interests, firms cannot exert direct pressure on European officials to 
reinforce their demands. 
  
Therefore, business access is not automatic; it depends on the degree to which 
private actors can offer the elements the Commission is interested in. Business 
lobbying on trade is thus marked by a particular exchange logic, where firms provide 
expertise and support in order to gain access to the policy process (Bouwen 2002; 
Mahoney 2004). 
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The selective access at the European level creates a two-channel logic for business 
lobbyists, which specifies different routes according to the content that firms seek to 
defend. Classical protectionism is easier to achieve in interaction with national 
governments, while cooperation on the elaboration of pan-European solutions 
promises an excellent working relationship with the European Commission. Pan-
European trade policy lobbying can be in support of liberalization, but it can also 
consist of regulatory protectionism that does not discriminate on the grounds of 
nationality but appeals instead to a greater Community interest. 
  
In fact, the tendency of the EU to defend a rather liberal external trade policy is 
relatively recent. Hanson (1998) argues that member states maintained national 
levels of protection in sensitive sectors throughout the 1970s and 1980s, despite the 
fact that a common commercial policy was enshrined in the Treaty of Rome. 
However, through the completion of the internal market, member states lost their 
ability to use national policy tools, in particular due to the legislative instruments 
available to the Commission in enforcing market integration (Schmidt 2000). 
Moreover, EU voting rules make it difficult to replace national policies with 
protectionism at the EU level (Hanson 1998: 56). Consensual decision-making on 
trade policy means that measures favouring the sensitive industries in only a few 
countries will be vetoed by other countries. 
  
Yet, even if the Commission is more liberal than many of the member states, 
supranational trade policy initiatives are not always aimed at reducing trade barriers. 
In fact, the Commission does not have an a priori tendency to liberalize; it merely 
seeks to develop pan-European policy solutions that do not create cleavages 
between member states in order to avoid deadlock. Liberalization happens to be a 
pan-European solution, but pan-European regulation is also possible. Many have 
noted that the liberalization objectives of the EU often appear like an exercise in 
international regulation rather than the complete abandonment of all trade barriers 
(Winters 2001; Cremona 2001). Alasdair Young (2002) argues that EU external 
policy is most accurately described as an attempt to extend European cooperation to 
third countries. Moreover, regulatory harmonization within the single market 
infrequently creates "regulatory peaks," as many of the prominent trade disputes 
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between the EU and third countries illustrate (Young 2004). In other words, even 
though we should expect protectionist lobbying to employ national routes and 
businesses supporting liberalization to develop partnerships with the European 
Commission, we might also find lobbyists defending new kinds of regulatory 
protectionism that applies equally across member states. 
  
  
2    Lobbying for protectionism or liberalization 
  
What does this mean for industry lobbyists and why is it relevant to distinguish 
between classic protectionism and pan-European regulatory protectionism? With few 
exceptions, European trade policy applies to all industries alike, so we should expect 
producers and firms to move their lobbying efforts to the supranational level. 
Surprisingly, this is not the case. By comparing lobbying in agriculture and textiles 
and clothing, we can see that protectionist lobbying is only successful when it is 
supported within the member states, which is why lobbyists eventually have to 
concentrate their efforts on the domestic route. Tellingly, lobbyists targeting the 
Commission to maintain import restrictions on textiles and clothing were ignored in 
the absence of member state pressure. By contrast, a study of the service trade 
shows how business lobbyists have been able to influence the European 
Commission's objective once they embraced liberalization as a policy objective. This 
was easy for the exporting companies in financial services, but required an important 
redefinition of policy demands in telecommunication services, where firms were not 
naturally inclined to support liberalization. Distinguishing between the types of 
demands can thus help to explain the success or failure of trade policy lobbying in 
the EU.  
  
  
2.1   Resistance to foreign competition: agriculture and textiles  
  
2.1.1  Agriculture 
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The agricultural market, one of the most integrated markets in the European Union, is 
characterized by a highly centralized structure of interest representation at the 
supranational level: the Comité des organizations professionnelles agricoles (COPA), 
founded in 1958. Despite the close, traditionally quasi-corporatist relations between 
COPA and the EU Institution on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), lobbying on 
multilateral trade issues has, most importantly, passed through national channels. 
Starting in the 1980s, the crisis of CAP dissolved the consensus between national 
agricultural organizations and left space for a more pluralist organization of 
agricultural interest groups. Several unified demonstration in Brussels 
notwithstanding, the diversification of interest representation implies that interest 
representation on external trade is mediated by the member states (Delorme 2002).  
  
Indeed, during the first years of the Uruguay Round, national farmer organizations, 
most notably in France and Germany, lobbied heavily to ensure that their 
governments did not cede ground on agricultural liberalization. In December 1990, 
strong internal divisions between the EU member states led to a rejection of the 
settlement on agriculture that was supposed to conclude the Uruguay Round. The 
Commission hoped to strike a compromise by tying the multilateral negotiations to a 
reform of CAP. At the beginning of the CAP reform process, the Commission had 
tried to consult with national farmers' unions, but eventually abandoned its contacts 
when it realized that farmers were not willing to move away from the status quo (Vahl 
1997: 149). As a consequence, the Commission negotiated directly with the member 
states and isolated itself from the critical farmers' union. In reaction, "farmers' unions 
simply intensified their lobbying activities at the member state level" to block CAP 
reform and concession in the GATT negotiations (Van den Hoven 2002: 11). Once 
the Commission succeeded in a negotiating a compromise with the US at Blair 
House in Washington, D.C. in 1992, it was again the French government which 
threatened to veto the agreement. Since Germany had shifted its position to support 
the Blair House Accord, France ended up in an isolated position and did not carry 
through its threat (Balaam 1999: 60). 
  
During the new round of trade talks, opposition to liberalization was also channelled 
through national routes. France and Ireland publicly criticized the Commission's 
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negotiating position during the Doha ministerial meeting, arguing that the defence of 
CAP ought to be the EU's priority for negotiations (Van den Hoven 2002: 19-20). Until 
the time of writing, member state disagreement has severely constrained the 
Commission's room for manoeuvre in the current negotiations. It is thus member 
state opposition, not agricultural lobbying, that explains development in agricultural 
trade negotiations. For the Commission, successful negotiations require neutralizing 
member state opposition, not resisting protectionist lobbyists at the supranational 
level.  
  
  
2.1.2  Textiles and clothing 
  
As in agriculture, protectionism in textiles and clothing was achieved through national 
strategies. Inversely, when interest groups had to start interacting with the European 
Commission, lobbying for protectionism became increasingly difficult. Protectionism 
in textiles and clothing dates was enshrined in four successive Multifibre 
Arrangements (MFA) from 1974-1994 and ended with a Uruguay Round Agreement 
on Textiles and Clothing, which stipulated that the MFA will be phased out over a ten 
year period.[3] 
  
 Throughout the MFA period, the orientation of the respective arrangements resulted 
from intense intergovernmental bargaining. The relatively moderate EU policy on 
MFA I (1974-6) was influenced by the liberal German and Dutch approach, which 
resisted US calls for strict protectionism. Since the EU industry had not yet lost its 
comparative advantage, the Commission did not want to intervene. Once the textiles 
and clothing trade balance deteriorated, the Committee for the Textile Industries in 
the European Community (COMITEXTIL) lobbied heavily in Brussels to draw 
attention to the dramatic fall in employment in the sector. Unimpressed and doubting 
the reliability of the figures, the Commission maintained that it would be wrong to give 
in to these protectionist demands. But things were different in the Council. Member 
states felt concerned about the health of their textiles and clothing industries and 
announced that the EU policy should be centred on voluntary export restraints (Ugur 
1998: 660). In the difficult economic times of the late 1970s, the UK had joined 
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France and Ireland's strict protectionist demands, supported also in Italy. Moderate 
countries seeking a simple renewal of the MFA were eventually outnumbered 
(Aggarwal 1985: 146). Faced with insistent member states determined to protect 
what they considered to be their national interest, the Commission had to switch to a 
protectionist trade policy during MFA II and MFA III (1977-85). 
  
The shift towards gradual liberalization under MFA IV (1986-1994) was tied to the 
desire of developed countries to open up trade in services and other new issues 
(Woolcock 2000: 378). Yet protectionist lobbying at the European level had not 
ceased in 1985. COMITEXTIL worked hard to draw attention to the difficult situation 
in the sector. Contrary to previous success, the industry difficulties were seized on by 
opponents of textile protection to show that earlier measures had not left the industry 
better off. As European countries turned away from Keynesian demand 
management, member state support faded. Despite intense lobbying from 
COMITEXTIL, trade unions and other textile associations, national representatives on 
the Article 133 Committee and COREPER were able to work out a compromise in 
favour of gradual liberalization. In 1989, moreover, the Commission accepted the 
mid-term review of the Uruguay Round, against the insistence of the textile industry 
association (Ugur 1998: 663). In 1990s, the Commission issued a communication 
underlining that restructuring was appropriate for the industry and Sir Leon Brittan 
announced to a shocked industry audience that "the textile industry is a normal 
industry" (cited in Scheffer 2003). Without the backing of the member states, 
protectionist lobbying in textiles and clothing at the EU level was a failure. 
  
In a last attempt to secure special treatment in EU trade policy, industry 
representatives formed a new coalition, the European Textile and Clothing Coalition, 
to avert the dangers of the new policy orientation in the early 1990s. Simultaneously, 
the European Trade Union Committee for Textiles began to organize meetings and 
demonstrations. All of these efforts were ignored by the Commission, which insisted 
that the industry's problems had to be resolved by securing a market opening in third 
countries (Ugur 1998: 664-5). At the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, the EU had 
endorsed the WTO's Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, which was to phase out all 
protection until January 2005. 
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 Faced with this new reality, the textile industry had to reorganize. COMITEXTIL, 
while other textile associations founded a new European association in 1995: the 
European Apparel and Textile Organization EURATEX. Needing to work with the 
Commission in order to affect or delay the integration of sensitive categories into the 
WTO agreement, EURATEX launched a review of its strategy (Scheffer 2003). In 
contrast to the unsuccessful pressure lobbying that had characterized earlier 
protectionist demands, European industry representatives decided to engage in a 
more cooperative manner with the European institutions. As Jacomet (2000: 307) 
underlines, the new "interactive lobbying" during the WTO negotiations in the early 
1990s had differed sharply from previous activities because lobbyists had to accept a 
"trade-off" in the policy demands they could voice: they exchanged the elimination of 
the MFA for market access in third countries. Only by embracing a policy stance 
centred on market access did textile lobbyists maintain their contacts with the 
European institutions. Indeed, the selection logic of the EU Institutions forcing 
European industry representatives to reframe their demands helps to explain why the 
EU textile industry became supportive of foreign market access while their American 
colleagues continued to press for strict protectionism. The need to supply a specific 
kind of lobbying at the supranational level also becomes clear in the reorganization of 
EURATEX. As a result of its internal review, EURATEX decided to develop a more 
comprehensive policy "in order to be seen as relevant partners for policy-makers" 
(Scheffer 2003: 108). Faced with very heterogeneous demands from its national 
associations, EURATEX now aims not to counteract national lobbying, but to promote 
synergies between domestic and European efforts. After the lobbying failures of the 
past, EURATEX's approach today is to focus on pan-European stances to maintain 
its leadership role at the EU level. 
  
At the end of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing's transition period in 2005, 
European companies complained vigorously about Chinese competition. Still, 
companies acknowledged that the abandonment of the quota system was beyond 
their control. Whether they liked it or not, "the affected companies had to accept the 
new logic in order to be able to influence the calendar, the modalities of the new 
measures or the transition aid" (Jacomet 2004: 5). In the absence of member state 
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pressure for protection, successful business– government relations at the 
supranational level required accepting the liberalization objective of the European 
Commission. 
  
  
2.2   Developing pan-European policy solutions: trade in services 
  
The multilateral General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) that entered into 
force with the founding of the WTO in 1995 is often cited as a prime example of 
business influence over trade policy. According to many observers, the American 
financial service companies and its Coalition for Service Industries played a key role 
in bringing the issue onto the international negotiating table (Drake and Nicolaïdis 
1992; Sell 2000; Woll 2004). On the European side, firms were much less in 
evidence during the service negotiations in the Uruguay Round and the sectoral 
negotiations that followed GATS. However, the European Commission did consult 
extensively with industry representatives in two sectors: financial services and 
telecommunication services (Van den Hoven 2002: 10). 
  
  
2.2.1  Financial services 
  
At the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, countries agreed to continue sectoral 
negotiations on financial services to obtain more detailed liberalization commitments. 
By the initial deadline in 1995, the US declared itself unsatisfied with the existing 
offers and walked out of the negotiations. Behind the position of the US government 
was the frustration of the US private sector, which had helped to put services on the 
WTO agenda and now felt that it was not achieving sufficient market access in 
foreign countries (Woolcock 1998).  
  
Faced with the US refusal, the EU assumed the leadership in the financial service 
talks and encouraged WTO members to negotiate an interim agreement without the 
US in 1995 and to extend the talks until December 1997. Over the next two years, 
the European Commission went out of its way to gain the support of European 
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financial service firms so it could counter the influence of the US private sector. 
Indeed, representatives of "Citicorp, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch and the insurance 
companies –  particularly the American Insurance Group and Aetna –  established 
command posts" near the WTO headquarters and conferred with American 
negotiators throughout the financial service talks (Andrews 1997).  
  
Business lobbying comparable to the activities of the US Coalition of Service 
Industries was only common in the United Kingdom, where financial service firms had 
founded British Invisibles in 1986, an association to promote the interests of its 
members, which later turned into International Financial Services London. Part of 
British Invisibles was the working committee LOTIS (the acronym for Liberalisation Of 
Trade In Services), which dates back to the early 1980s (see Wesselius 2001). For 
the European Commission, working with these private sector associations was 
crucial, because they felt that European firms could best engage the US private 
sector in a continued dialogue. Transnational business negotiations began at the 
World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland in 1996. US, UK and European 
financial service representatives met in the office of British Invisibles and eventually 
formed the Financial Leaders Group to promote the interests of the affected firms on 
both sides of the Atlantic (Sell 2000: 178).  
  
The European Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan welcomed the creation of this group 
and worked closely with its European chair, Andrew Buxton of Barclays Bank 
(Wesselius 2002: 7). For the EU negotiators, the Financial Leaders Group was an 
important channel through which they hoped to moderate US expectations, in 
particular by addressing the concerns of the US private sectors, which had previously 
brought the talks to a standstill (Woolcock 1998: 33). Sir Leon Brittan had long been 
frustrated with the lack of support among European companies and tried to 
encourage them to mobilize around the issue of international trade liberalization. A 
representative of the European service sector remembers:  
  
"At one occasion, he finally invited a series of CEOs for dinner and said s 
omething to the effect of 'either you will get organized, or I will take the decisions 
single-handedly [4]'."  
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Contrary to the aggressive lobbying of US financial service firms, European firms 
entered negotiations not so much on their own initiative but, most importantly, in 
response to the active encouragement of the European Commission, which was 
looking for business support for the difficult financial service talks in the 1990s. The 
close business– government relationship that developed in the EU after 1996 was 
based on the shared aim of liberalizing the sector. After an unexpected change in the 
position of the Asian countries during the currency crisis in 1997, negotiators finally 
reached an agreement on December 12, 1997. Yet the cooperation between financial 
service firm leaders and the European Commission went even further than the 
Financial Service Agreement. In 1998, Sir Leon Brittan asked Andrew Buxton once 
again to create a select group of, this time, purely European business leaders. The 
European Service Forum, launched on January 26, 1999, today ensures the 
Commission's continued support for the liberalization of service industries and 
consequentially benefits from privileged access to trade policy-making at the 
supranational level. Had European firms not been supportive of liberalization, it is 
highly unlikely that they would have been able to work as closely with EU policy-
makers.  
  
  
2.2.2  Telecommunications 
  
In telecommunications, the position of firms was more difficult. European network 
operators had long benefited from privileged positions as monopoly providers in their 
home countries. The WTO's sectoral negotiations on basic telecommunications 
liberalization from 1994-1997 coincided with the liberalization of the internal EU 
market. While firms wanted to benefit from foreign market access once 
telecommunication markets were liberalized, they were also concerned about 
protecting their home market positions. Solicited by the European Commission, 
European operators therefore adopted a pro-liberalization stance in the mid-1990s, 
which allowed them to follow and influence the content of the multilateral negotiation 
in the WTO while still maintaining close ties to their home governments in order to 
defend national interests on specific issues.  
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In fact, the project of European telecommunications liberalization had met with very 
different echoes in European member states. The United Kingdom and the Nordic 
countries had introduced competition in their home markets and pushed actively for 
Europe-wide liberalization. Germany, France and the Benelux countries had initiated 
more moderate reforms, but had their reservations about complete liberalization. 
However, the Southern countries –  Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal –  were not 
interested in changing their telecommunication systems (see Noam 1992). The 
struggle between the European Commission and the member states over internal 
telecommunications liberalization began in 1987 and is recounted elsewhere in great 
detail (e.g. Sandholtz 1998; Thatcher 1999b; Eliassen and Sjøvaag 1999; Holmes 
and Young 2002). After some judicial wrangling over EU competences, the 
Commission was able to propose the liberalization of telephone services in 1993 and 
infrastructures in 1994. In 1996, member states reached agreement on implementing 
liberalization by January 1, 1998. What is important for an understanding of the WTO 
involvement of European network operators is the consultation efforts made by the 
European Commission during the internal liberalization project.  
  
Trying to gain support in the face of member state resistance, Martin Bangemann, 
European Commissioner for Industry, Information Technology and 
Telecommunications, called together a group of "wise men," leaders from the 
telecom industry and user companies, in order to prepare a communication on the 
international competitiveness of European telecommunications. The consultation 
procedure is noteworthy, because the Commission dealt with the senior officials of 
the national operators directly and encouraged them to evaluate their position in the 
internationalizing market. Under pressure from user companies and competition from 
liberalized countries attracting telecommunications-based firms, operators in France 
and Germany began to concentrate on reform and internationalization, and therefore 
supported the EU liberalization (Thatcher 1999a). With the backing of the leading 
European telecommunications providers, the report issued by the senior official 
group, the so-called Bangemann report, was important for encouraging member 
states onto the route of liberalization (High-Level Group on the Information Society 
1994).  
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Lobbying on multilateral liberalization was closely connected to internal liberalization. 
Before 1996, European network operators were not involved in the sectoral 
negotiations that had begun in 1994 (Woll 2004). With the announcement of the 1998 
deadline, the European Telecommunication Network Operators association (ETNO), 
founded in 1992, was able to gather support for multilateral liberalization as well. A 
member of the WTO working group recalls:  
  
"We had good relations with the European Commission. There was no opposition: 
the Commission works for Europe and we work for Europe as well. [5]"  
  
ETNO fully supported the multilateral negotiations and helped the Commission 
negotiate the Basic Telecom Agreement in 1997.  
  
Indeed, most operators affirm having been in support of the 1997 agreement and 
having engaged actively through their European association throughout the talks. 
Despite these declarations, many operators had concerns about losing their national 
privileges and so used their national ties to maintain a degree of control over access 
to their home markets. Telefónica, the Spanish operator, for example, insisted on 
restricting non-EC investment to the Spanish market, despite the fact that it had 
become an important overseas investor in Latin America. When the US criticized the 
Spanish position, negotiations over the case turned into bilateral talks between the 
Commission and the Spanish government, which had taken up the highly politicized 
issue (Niemann 2004: 399). Similarly, network operators in other countries tried to 
guarantee national privileges through the implementation of the EC regulatory 
framework. Member states and their regulatory agencies enjoyed immense freedom 
to determine interconnection terms and tariffs between networks or to impose 
universal service conditions. In contrast to British Telecom, which received no extra 
funding for universal service, France Télécom had the right to obtain compensation 
(Thatcher 1999a). At the same time that ETNO was lobbying for reciprocal 
liberalization of basic telecommunication services through the WTO, national 
operators were seeking to maintain regulatory advantages, i.e. restrictions to foreign 
market access, through their national governments.  
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3    Conclusion 
  
The comparison between agriculture, textiles and clothing, financial services and 
telecommunication services shows that trade policy lobbying in the EU is marked by 
a two-channel logic. Protectionism (agriculture) is best defended through the national 
route, while lobbying in support of liberalization (financial services) happens at the 
supranational level, in particular through contacts with the European Commission. 
Companies that seek both foreign market access and restrictions to competition in 
their home markets therefore tend to adopt an ambiguous position, whereby they 
support liberalization in general, in order to stay in contact with the European 
Commission, but also work through their member states to maintain national 
restrictions (telecommunications). Without the backing of their home governments, 
protectionist lobbying that impedes European market integration is unsuccessful at 
the supranational level (textiles and clothing). In trade policy, firms thus face a trade-
off: if they want to maintain good relations with the European Commission, they have 
to frame their demands in terms of pan-European solutions, which often means 
moving away from their immediate interest.  
  
The entrepreneurial role of the European Commission in creating public– private 
contacts on trade policy has several implications. First of all, not just businesses but 
also other interest groups, such as environmental or social NGOs, can be solicited for 
input into the European trade policy process. As current consultation demonstrates, 
the Commission has indeed made an effort to include an ever broader range of 
actors in order to increase its legitimacy and work towards a policy consensus 
(Woolcock 2000). However, firms remain the principal source of expertise on trade 
barriers and will therefore come into their own whenever the EU seeks to increase its 
leverage vis-à-vis trading partners such as the US. It is therefore important not to 
overestimate the influence of public interest groups (De Bièvre and Dür forthcoming), 
even though the Commission tries to take their opinion into account through the Civil 
Society Dialogue.  
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Second, the complexity of the strategic interactions in European trade policy caution 
against superficial analyses of trade policy demands in the EU. Because of the two-
channel logic, we should expect to find many firms declaring themselves in favour of 
trade liberalization, simply because this ensures them greater access to the EU trade 
negotiators. A study of trade preferences thus needs to distinguish between the 
strategic positions of firms and their underlying preferences, which might be much 
more ambiguous than the official declarations would lead us to believe. Finally, the 
comparison between the various business– government relations shows that 
European trade policy lobbying is complex. To assume that trade policy simply 
reflects producer demands, as many have suggested in the case of the US, would be 
to miss important aspects of public– private relations in the EU. While firms might 
capture their government's positions or even the supranational agenda in certain 
cases, the Commission also instrumentalizes European firms and even affects the 
content of their lobbying demands. In the end, EU trade policy results as much from 
producer demands as it does from the complex decision-making procedures, the 
institutional self-interest of public actors and the power struggles created by their 
interaction.  
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